THE RIGHT OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEES TO A

TRIAL DE NOVO UNDER THE EQUAL
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
ACT OF 1972
In Hackley v. Johnson' and a companion case, Franklinv. Laird,2
the District Court for the District of Columbia held that employees of
the federal government, who seek judicial relief from alleged discriminatory promotion practices because of dissatisfaction with the administrative resolution of their grievances, are not entitled to a trial de
novo in the federal courts under section 717 of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the Equal Employment Opportunity
Act of 1972.8 Accordingly, in each case the court upheld the adminis1. 360 F. Supp. 1247 (D.D.C. 1973).
2. Id.
3. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 § 11, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-16
(Supp. 1974), amending Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970). This
amendment adds section 717 to the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The new provision provides in relevant part:
(a) All personnel action affecting [federal] employees or applicants for
[such] employment . . . shall be made free from any discrimination based
on race, color, religion, sex or national origin.
(b) Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, the Civil Service
Commission shall have authority to enforce the provisions of subsection (a)
of this section through appropriate remedies, including reinstatement or hiring
of employees with or without back pay, as will effectuate the policies of this
section, and shall issue such rules, regulations, orders and instructions as it
deems necessary and appropriate to carry out its responsibilities under this
section ....
The head of each such department, agency, or unit shall comply with such
rules, regulations, orders, and instructions which shall include a provision
that an employee or applicant for employment shall be notified of any final
action taken on any complaint of discrimination filed by him thereunder.
(c) Within thirty days of receipt of notice of final action taken by a
department, agency, or unit referred to in subsection (a), or by the Civil
Service Commission upon an appeal from a decision or order of such department, agency, or unit on a complaint of discrimination based on race, color,
religion, sex or national origin, brought pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, Executive Order 11478 or any succeeding Executive orders, or after one
hundred and eighty days from the filing of the initial charge with the department, agency, or unit or with the Civil Service Commission on appeal from
a decision or order of such department, agency, or unit until such time as
final action may be taken by a department, agency, or unit, an employee or
applicant for employment if aggrieved by the final disposition of his complaint, may file a civil action as provided in section 2000e-5 of this title, in
which civil action the head of the department, agency, or unit, as appropriate,
shall be the defendant.
(d) The provisions of section 2000e-5(f) through (k), of this title, as
applicable, shall govern civil actions brought hereunder.
....

(Emphasis added.)
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trative determinations solely on the basis of the record compiled at the
agency level.
The plaintiff in Hackley filed a complaint with the Veterans Administration (VA) alleging that, after one year's service as an investi-

gator at the GS-12 level, he had been denied promotion to GS-13
because of racial prejudice. 4

After a hearing which encompassed

seven days and produced a record of 985 pages in length, the VA
determined that the plaintiff's failure to receive a promotion was at-

tributable solely to his lack of qualifications and was not a result of
racial discrimination. 5 The Board of Appeals and Review of the Civil
Service Commission affirmed."

remedies, 7

Having exhausted his administrative

the plaintiff filed a civil action in the district court and de-

manded a new trial on the issue of discrimination. s Relying primarily
on the legislative history of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,

as amended by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 9 the

4. 360 F. Supp. at 1254. The plaintiff alleged that there was a climate of racial
prejudice in the Investigation and Security Service division of the VA, which was evidenced by the absence of other blacks in positions comparable to that of the plaintiff,
and by the middle-level supervisors' use of racial epithets. The plaintiff attributed his
earlier promotions from his hiring level of GS-7 through GS-12 to the influence of
a black director of the division who had departed prior to the institution of the initial
complaint with the VA.
5. Id. The VA Appeals Examiners' findings were summarized by the court:
Plaintiff's claim is rejected by the administrative agency because (1) he
required more training since he was less experienced and (2) the same middle-level supervisors supposedly discriminating against Hackley promoted
Hackley to GS-12, promoted a Mexican-American to GS-13 with only 14
months' experience, and denied promotions to whites with far greater experience than Hackley ...
. . . Not only is there no proof that plaintiff received promotions only
because at that time he had a black Director who recognized his worth, but
there is repeated affirmative evidence in the administrative record making it
crystal clear that plaintiff's promotions to GS-12 and his failure to achieve
GS-13 are solely related to his qualifications. Plaintiff entered this field with
substantially less than the normal relevant investigative experience. Progression to GS-12 was normal as it is rather automatic to proceed one grade scale
in about one year if work is satisfactory. However, the GS-13 level is another matter. Such an investigator is judged to be capable of handling any
investigation in any program at any level.
m. . [The plaintiff] has very little investigative experience compared to
most of his colleagues and therefore quite properly he is required more frequently to assist another investigator in the handling of cases before he gets
many complex cases on his own. Moreover, many whites with far more experience have remained at GS-12 for a greater length of time before promotion to GS-13. Id. at 1254-55.
6. Id. at 1254.
7. See note 54 infra and accompanying text.
8. The plaintiff relied primarily upon section 717 of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964. See note 3 supra. The court also noted that the plaintiffs in both cases
invoked "other civil rights acts, as well as the Constitution." 360 F. Supp. at 1249.
However, these latter provisions are neither delineated specifically nor discussed further
by the court.
9. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-16 (Supp. 1974). See note 3 supra for the text of the
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court denied the motion for a trial de novo and granted the govern.

ment's motion for summary judgment.'0
In Franklin, the plaintiff alleged that he had been denied appro-

priate training and promotion from GS-7 to GS-11 because of racial
discrimination.'- After an informal protest and the settlement of an
initial formal complaint had failed to provide satisfactory relief,' 2 the
plaintiff initiated a second formal complaint with the Army Civilian
Appellate Review Office, which found no discrimination and rejected

his complaint' 3

Plaintiff appealed to the Civil Service Commission,

which reversed the Army's decision after a hearing that compiled 250

pages of testimony.

The Civil Service Commission Appeals Exam-

iner found that the Army's failure to provide the plaintiff with ade-

quate training was primarily motivated by racial prejudice and recommended an ameliorative program, which the Army then instituted after
some modification. 14 Claiming this modification deprived him of a
right stemming from the Examiner's order to transfer him into another
specific department at a starting level of GS-9 with a target level of GS13, the plaintiff appealed to the Board of Appeals and Review of the
Civil Service Commission. The Board held that the Army's curative

action was sufficient to eradicate the harmful effects of the discrimistatute. See notes 25-41 infra and accompanying text for the legislative history of the
Act.
10. 360 F. Supp. at 1255.
11. Id. at 1253. The plaintiff was originally employed as a career intern at the
starting level of GS-7 in the Logistics Division of the Supply Management branch of
the Walter Reed Army Medical Center. He asserted that, because of his status as an
intern, he should have been given the training necessary to enable him to advance to
the GS-11 level.
12. After the initial informal protest by the plaintiff, his Army supervisors acknowledged his improper status, promoted him from GS-7 to GS-9, and promised to
furnish training which would enable him to advance further. Thereafter, a second misunderstanding arose between plaintiff and his supervisors, which led the plaintiff to
institute a second protest by the filing of a formal complaint. After one year of inconclusive proceedings, the grievance underlying this initial complaint was informally resolved and it was withdrawn by the plaintiff. Id. at 1253.
13. Id.
14. Id. The Appeals Examiner recommended (1) that the plaintiff be placed in
a new intern program outside of the Logistics Division; (2) that the Army provide
a clear definition of the training program and the goal of that program; (3) that the
plaintiff's records of leave and production, which had been adversely affected by his
efforts to vindicate his employment rights, be expunged; (4) that the plaintiff be given
an opportunity to compete equally with his peers; and (5) that the equal employment
office monitor the plaintiff's progress.
The Army instituted the recommended program with two exceptions. The plaintiff
was not transferred from the Logistics Division, and consequently he was to remain
at GS-9, with all training programs targeted only to improve his performance at that
level.
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nation.' 5 Dissatisfied with the remedies provided, the plaintiff instituted suit in the district court and moved for a new trial on this issue.
As in Hackley, the motion for a trial de novo was denied.1
The
court ordered a modification of the Board's order and, with that modi7
fication, granted summary judgment for the defendant.
Congress enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964"8 in
an attempt to eliminate employment discrimination based on race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin. 19 As originally enacted, Title
VII did not apply to employees of the federal government. In recognition of the prior declarations by the Supreme Court that the due

process clause of the fifth amendment prohibited invidious discrimination by the federal government,2" Congress had, before the enactment

of Title VII, declared that "it is the policy of the United States to
insure equal employment opportunities for [its] employees without

discrimination.

...
2 Rather than providing for the implementation

of this policy through the procedural matrix of Title VII, however,

Congress chose to allow the President to guarantee equal employment
opportunity through his already existing authority as head of the execu-

utive branch.22 Inresponse to this congressional mandate, both Presidents Johnson and Nixon promulgated executive orders23 which placed
15. Id.
16. Id. at 1252-53.
17. Id. at 1253-54. The court held that the "essential aspects" of the Board's decision were supported by the evidence in the record:
Franklin complains of the review decision because his
request
[which was suggested as a remedy for the first time on appeal before the
Board] to be an intern in the Personnel Management Career Program with
entrance grade of GS-9 and Target grade of GS-13 was rejected. The rejection is, however, justified. Franklin entered Logistics at GS-7 with a target
of GS-9. There is no evidence Franklin was ever given a higher target. GS9 is considered the journeyman level at which the internship in Logistics is
terminated. Thereafter advancement to GS-11 is competitive, and is relatively
difficult because Logistics .. . is a small unit warranting but a single GS11 position . . . . As to entering this particular new field at the same GS9 level, such corrective action is not possible because Franklin does not possess the necessary two years of specialized experience for entrance into Personnel Management at that level. Id. at 1253.
The court did make an important modification by adopting the earlier recommendation
of the Civil Service Commission Appeals Officer that the plaintiff be given the opportunity "to transfer to any position at GS-9 for which he is qualified . . . either at
or outside [Walter Reed Hospital], in or out of Logistics," and not confined solely
to a transfer to the Personnel Department of the hospital. Id. at 1254. With that
modification of the order, summary judgment for the government was granted.
18. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970).
19. See H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1963).
20. See, e.g., Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
21. 5 U.S.C. § 7151 (1970).
22. Id. See generally Sape & Hart, Title VII Reconsidered: The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 40 GEo. WAsH. L. Ray. 824, 853-54 (1972).
23. In the year immediately following passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
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the policy of non-discrimination under the direct supervision of the
24
Civil Service Commission.
By 1971, it had become apparent that, despite some progress,
the existing system had not succeeded in eliminating employment discrimination from the federal government. 25 In response, the House
version of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 extended
Title VII to cover federal government employees. 26 The House also
President Johnson issued Exec. Order 11246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-65 Comp.), which
prohibited discrimination because of race, religion, or national origin within the executive branch of the federal government. He later issued a supplemental order which
covered sex discrimination. Exec. Order 11375, amending Exec. Order 11246, 3 C.F.R.
320 (1967 Comp.).
In 1969, President Nixon issued Exec. Order 11478, 3 C.F.R. 133 (1969 Comp.).
The Nixon order supplements and extends the Johnson order in several minor respects.
Id.
24. The Civil Service Commission was empowered by these orders to oversee the
implementation of programs for equal employment opportunity by the heads of all executive departments and agencies. Further, the Commission was to establish procedures whereby any person complaining of illegal bias would be guaranteed at least one
review within the department or agency with right of appeal to the Commission. Exec.
Order 11478, 3 C.F.R. 133 (1969 Comp.).
The Civil Service Commission regulations detailing the requirements for the heads
of federal agencies and executive departments are detailed in 5 C.F.R. §§ 713.203-.204
(1973). The regulations governing the filing of discrimination complaints appear at
5 C.F.R. § 713.214 (1973). For a critical discussion of Civil Service Commission procedure in federal employment discrimination cases prior to the enactment of the Equal
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, see Comment, Racial Discriminationin the Federal Civil Service, 38 GEO. WASH. L. Rlv. 265 (1969).
25. See H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1971), in which the House
Labor Committee stated:
Despite some progress that has been made in this area, the record is far from
satisfactory. Statistical evidence shows that minorities and women continue
to be excluded from large numbers of government jobs, particularly at the
higher grade levels.
This disproportionatte [sic] distribution of minorities and women throughout
the Federal bureaucracy and their exclusion from higher level policy-making
and supervisory positions indicates the government's failure to pursue its policy of equal opportunity.
The Senate Labor Committee concurred in this view. See S. REP. No. 415, 92d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1971) where the Senate Labor Committee declared:
The federal government with 2.6 million employees, is the single largest
employer in the nation. It also comprises the central policy-making and administrative network for the Nation. Consequently, its policies, actions, and
programs strongly influence the activities of all other enterprises, organizations and groups. In no area is government action more important than in
the area of civil rights.
Progress has been made in this field, however, much remains to be done.
Statistical evidence shows that minorities and women continue to be denied
access to a large number of government jobs, particularly in the higher grade
levels. Id. at 11-12.
26. H.R. 1746, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 11 (1971).
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proposed replacing the Civil Service Commission with the Equal Em-

ployment Opportunity Commission as the agency directly responsible
for resolving complaints of discrimination in the federal bureaucracy.2 7

The Senate, however, rejected this proposal, 28 and the final version

of section 717 of the Civil Rights Act, as added by the Equal Em-

ployment Opportunity Act of 1972, leaves the primary responsibility
for resolution of federal employees' discrimination claims with the
Civil Service Commission.29 In order to increase its effectiveness, the
27. Id. The House Labor Committee expressed a lack of confidence in the Civil
Service Commission's ability to eliminate discrimination from the federal government's
employment practices. See H.R. REP. No. 238, supra note 25, at 23-24:
The [existing] system, which permits the Civil Service Commission to
sit in judgment over its own practices and procedures which themselves may
raise questions of systemic discrimination, creates a built-in conflict-of-interest.
Testimony reflected a general lack of confidence in the effectiveness of
the complaint procedure on the part of Federal employees. Complainants
were skeptical of the Civil Service Commission's record in obtaining just resolutions of complaints and adequate remedies. This has discouraged persons
from filing complaints with the Commission for fear that it [sic] will only
result in antagonizing their supervisors and impairing any hope of future advancement.
Aside from the inherent structural defects the Civil Service Commission
has been plagued by a general lack of expertise in recognizing and isolating
the various forms of discrimination which exist in the system.
To correct this entrenched discrimination in the Federal service, it is necessary to insure the effective application of uniform, fair and strongly enforced policies. The present law and the proposed statute do not permit industry and labor organizations to be the judges of their own conduct in the
area of employment discrimination. There is no reason why government
agencies should not be treated similarly .

. .

. Because the Equal Employ-

ment Opportunity Commission is the expert agency in the field of employment discrimination and because it is an independent agency removed from
the administration of Federal employment, it is the most logical place for the
enforcement power to be vested.
For a critical analysis and illustrative case study of Civil Service Commission procedures prior to the enactment of the 1972 legislation, see Comment, supra note 24.
28. S. REP. No. 415, supra note 25, at 11-16. The Senate Labor Committee
stated:
The Civil Service Commission's primary responsibility over all personnel
matters in the Government does create a built-in conflict of interest for examining the Government's equal employment opportunity program for structural
defects which may result in a lack of true equal employment opportunity.
Yet, the Committee was persuaded that the Civil Service Commission is sincere in its dedication to the principles of equal employment opportunity enunpiated in Executive Order 11478 and that the Commission has the will and
desire to overcome any such conflict of interest. Id. at 15.
29. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 § 11, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-16
(Supp. 1974), amending Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970). This
amendment adds section 717 to the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The new section is
reproduced in relevant part in note 3 supra. See JoiNT EXPLANATORY STATEMENT OF
MANAGERS AT THE CONFERENCE ON H.R. 1746 To FURTHER PROMOTE EQUAL EmPLOYM:ENT OPPoRTuNITrEs FOR AMERIcAN WoRKERs, reprinted in BNA, THE EQUAL OpPORTUNrY AcT OF 1972, 119, 124-25 (1973). The Civil Service Commission has re-

sponded to the congressional mandate by promulgating a new comprehensive set of
regulations. See 5 C.F.R. § 713 (1973).
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Commission was empowered to enforce the policy of nondiscriminareintion in individual cases through "appropriate remedies including
30

statement or hiring of employees with or without back pay."

As an "adjunct" to the increased powers of the Civil Service

Commission, Congress for the first time declared in section 717 that
federal employees would have the right to file a civil action against the
federal government for a claim of employment discrimination. 31 Recognizing the difficulties that federal employees had previously encountered in the courts,3" Congress, through section 717, made several

provisions of section 706, 3 which governs the rights of private individuals under Title VII, specifically applicable to suits brought for relief

from employment discrimination practiced by the federal government. 4
These provisions govern such matters as time limitations,35 venue,30
30. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-16(b) (Supp. 1974), reproduced in note 3 supra.
31. Id. § 2000e-16(e), reproduced in note 3 supra. The Senate Labor Committee
explained the bill as follows:
An important adjunct to the strengthened Civil Service Commission responsibilities is the statutory provision of a private right of action in the
courts by Federal employees who are not satisfied with the agency or Commission decision.
.. .The provisions adopted by the committee will enable the Commission to grant full relief to aggrieved employees or applicants . . . . Aggrieved employees or applicants will also have the full rights available in the
courts as are granted to individualsin the private sector under Title VII.
The bill (section 717(c) ) enables the aggrieved Federal employee (or
applicant for employment) to file an action in the appropriate U.S. district
court after either a final order by his agency or a final order of the Civil
Service Commission on an appeal from an agency decision or order ....
It is intended that the employee have the option to go to the appropriate district court or the District Court for the District of Columbia after either the
final decision within his agency on his appeal from the personnel action complained of or after an appropriate appeal to the Civil Service Commission or
after the elapse of 180 days from the filing of the initial complaint or appeal with the Civil Service Commission. S. REP No. 415, supra note 25, at
16-17.
32. See S. Rm,. No. 415, supranote 25, at 16:
The testimony of the Civil Service Commission notwithstanding, the
committee found that an aggrieved Federal employee does not have access to
the courts. In many cases, the employee must overcome a . .. defense of
sovereign immunity or failure to exhaust administrative remedies with no
certainty as to the steps required to exhaust such remedies.
See also Sape & Hart, supra note 22, at 854-57. The judicial barriers to a civil suit
encountered by an aggrieved federal employee prior to the enactment of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 are discussed in more detail in notes 42-49 infra
and accompanying text.
33. 42U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1970).
34. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 § 11(d), 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e16(d) (Supp. 1974), amending Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970).
As previously noted, this amendment adds section 717 to the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
which is reproduced in relevant part in note 3 supra. The new subsection makes the
provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)-(k) applicable to civil suits by aggrieved federal
employees.
35. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1970). Section 717 states that the various provisions
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expedited hearings,

7

appointment of masters, 88 relief,

torney's fees, 40 and appeal. 4 1

9

award of at-

Prior to the enactment of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act
of 1972, the federal courts had placed several obstacles in the way
of a successful resolution of a claim of employment discrimination by
the federal government. In Keim v. United States,4 2 the Supreme
Court held that the "appointments clause?' of the Constitution 3 vested
almost complete discretion in the executive branch to hire or dismiss

federal employees.44

While Keim represents the leading exposition

of the doctrine of executive discretion in federal employment, later

cases have also evidenced a notable reluctance on the part of the
courts to interfere in the area absent specific authorization from Conof section 706 only govern civil suits by federal employees "as applicable." However,
the time limitations provided in section 706 apply only to proceedings before the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, the agency designated in that section to hear
employment discrimination claims brought by employees in the private sector. On the
other hand, it has previously been noted that section 717 places this function in the
hands of the Civil Service Commission and specifies its own set of time limitations
with respect to claims brought by federal employees. It would seem, therefore, that
the time limitations in section 717 largely displaced those provided in section 706. See
42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-16(c) (Supp. 1974), reproduced in note 3 supra.
36. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1970). Venue properly lies in any judicial district
where the alleged discrimination occurred, where the relevant employment records are
kept, where the plaintiff would have worked but for the alleged discrimination, or, if
the respondent is not found within any such district, where the respondent's principal
office is located.
37. Id. § 2000e-6(b) makes it incumbent upon the district courts to assign Title
VII cases for hearing at the earliest practicable date.
38. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(f)(5) (Supp. 1974) authorizes the district court to appoint a master to hear any Title VII case which has not been assigned for hearing
within 120 days "after issue has been joined." See FED. R. Civ. P. 53.
39. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1970) provides for injunctive as well as any other
appropriate relief, including reinstatement of wrongfully discharged employees, mandatory hiring of applicants wrongfully denied employment, and back pay in both cases.
40. Id. § 2000e-5(k) allows the court to award a reasonable attorney's fee to the
prevailing party.
41. Id. § 2000e-5(j). The statute provides that an adverse determination in any
civil action brought under section 706 may be appealed as provided in 28 U.S.C.
9§ 1291, 1292 (1970). See note 61 infra.
42. 177 U.S. 290 (1900). See also United States v. McLean, 95 U.S. 750 (1877);
Decatur v. Paulding, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 497 (1840); McEachern v. United States, 321
F.2d 31, 33 (4th Cir. 1963).
43. U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 2 provides:
[the President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Con[..
sent of the Senate, shall appoint . . . all other Officers of the United States,
whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall
be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment
of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, the
Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.
44. In the course of its opinion holding that the federal courts had no power to
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gress. 45 Thus, despite the fifth amendment's prohibition of discrimination by the federal government, 46 the victims of that discrimination
were forced to cast about for statutory provisions which would give
them access to the courts. Among the most notable of the various
statutory theories rejected by the courts were those based on the Administrative Procedure Act, 47 the Tucker Act, 48 and the executive orreview the dismissal of an employee for "inefficiency," the Court noted that Congress
could "by some special and direct legislation [enact a] provision to the contrary . .. .
177 U.S. at 296.
45. See generally Sape & Hart, supra note 22, at 854-55. For a more recent case
applying the doctrine of executive discretion, see Hargett v. Summerfield, 243 F.2d 29
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 970 (1957). In Hargett, the court held that judicial review of a federal employee dismissal was available "only to determine if there
has been substantial compliance with the pertinent statutory procedures provided by
Congress and no misconstruction of governing legislation." Id. at 32. The court specifically rejected the claim that the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 55159, 701-06 (1970), had placed the appointment and removal of federal officers within
the supervisory powers of the courts.
46. See note 20 supraand accompanying text.
47. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970). In addition to Hargett v. Summerfield, 243 F.2d 29
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 970 (1957), discussed in note 45 supra, cases holding the Administrative Procedure Act inapplicable to claims of discrimination by federal employees include Blackman v. Guerre, 342 U.S. 512, 513 (1952); Gnotta v.
United States, 415 F.2d 1271, 1275-76 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 934
(1970) (dismissal is a matter of agency discretion). See generally Comment, supra
note 24, at 290-92.
48. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (1970). The Tucker Act gives concurrent original
jurisdiction to the district courts and the Court of Claims over:
[a]ny other civil action or claim against the United States, not exceeding
$10,000 in amount, founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress, or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or
implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort. Id.
This seemingly broad grant of jurisdiction has been given a particularly narrow construction by the Eighth Circuit in employment discrimination cases, that court holding
that the Tucker Act is not applicable without an independent statutory grant of jurisdiction or authorization in an executive order. See Gnotta v. United States, 415 F.2d
1271, 1277-78 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 934 (1970); Love v. United
States, 108 F.2d 43 (8th Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 309 U.S. 673 (1940). Further, it
has been stated that the relationship between the government and its employees is a
matter of governmental sufferance and not a "contractual" right within the meaning
of the Tucker Act. See, e.g., Garner v. Board of Pub. Works, 341 U.S. 716, 724
(1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Taylor v. Beckman, 178 U.S. 548 (1900); Crenshaw v. United States, 134 U.S. 99 (1890); Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46 (D.C.
Cir. 1950), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 341 U.S. 918 (1951); Denning v.
United States, 132 F. Supp. 206 (Ct. Cl. 1955). See generally Comment, supra note
24, at 288-89. As the Supreme Court noted in a recent decision, however, the "rightprivilege" distinction on which this analysis is based has been "thoroughly undermined
in the ensuing years." Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571
n.9 (1972). See also Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374 (1971). See generally Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-PrivilegeDistinction in ConstitutionalLaw,
81 I-ARv. L. Rnv. 1439 (1968).
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ders promulgated under the congressional declaration of the policy
against discrimination.49 With respect to the last of these theories,
however, the Court of Claims took a contrary position and held in
Chambers v. United States5" that the federal courts in discrimination

cases had been implicitly granted jurisdiction to review agency action
by the executive orders promulgated under the mandate of the congressional declaration of the policy of non-discrimination. 51 Although
other courts began to follow the lead of the Chambers decision, the
question of jurisdiction over federal employment discrimination cases
52
was still unsettled prior to the passage of the 1972 legislation.
Even in those cases where a court was apparently willing to take
jurisdiction over a claim in the first instance, the government was frequently successful in interposing a defense of sovereign immunity."m
49. See notes 21-24 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the promulgation of the executive orders regarding federal employment discrimination. The use
of these orders as an independent fount of jurisdiction was specifically rejected in
Gnotta v. United States, 415 F.2d 1271 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 934
(1970).
50. 451 F.2d 1045 (Ct. CI. 1971). See also the companion case of Allison v.
United States, 451 F.2d 1035 (Ct. Cl. 1971). Both cases are noted in 47 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 358 (1972) and 1971 Developments 238.
51. 5 U.S.C. § 7151 (1970). See note 21 supra and accompanying text.
52. For post-Chambers decisions granting jurisdiction, see Polcover v. Secretary of
Treasury, 477 F.2d 1223 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Holden v. Finch, 446 F.2d 1311 (D.C.
Cir. 1971); Harris v. Nixon, 325 F. Supp. 28 (D. Colo. 1971). Prior to Chambers,
several courts undertook a review, albeit one of limited scope. See, e.g., Williams v.
Zuckert, 372 U.S. 765 (1963) (per curiam), vacating 296 F.2d 416 (D.C. Cir. 1961)
(review for denial of procedural due process at administrative hearing); Scott v. Macy,
402 F.2d 644 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Dabney v. Freeman, 358 F.2d 533 (D.C. Cir. 1965);
Studemeyer v. Macy, 320 F.2d 797 (D.C. Cir. 1963); Eustace v. Day, 314 F.2d 247
(D.C. Cir. 1962). Other courts, however, refused to take jurisdiction over federal employment discrimination cases. See, e.g., Gnotta v. United States, 415 F.2d 1271 (8th
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 934 (1970); Hargett v. Summerfield, 243 F.2d 29
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 970 (1957); Boylan v. Quarles, 235 F.2d 834 (D.C.
Cir. 1956); Benenati v. Young, 220 F.2d 383 (D.C. Cir. 1955); Williams v. Cravens,
210 F.2d 874 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 819 (1954); Kohberg v. Gray, 207
F.2d 35 (D.C. Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 937 (1954); Powell v. Brannan, 196
F.2d 871 (D.C. Cir. 1952); Carter v. Forrestal, 175 F.2d 364 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
338 U.S. 832 (1949). See generally Sape & Hart, supra note 22, at 853-57; Comment,
supra note 24, at 288-95.
53. The cases have not clearly specified whether sovereign immunity precludes subject matter jurisdiction or provides the government with a defense against an otherwise
cognizable claim. See, e.g., Beale v. Blount, 461 F.2d 1133 (5th Cir. 1972), noted
in 41 GEO. WASH. L Rv. 657 (1973); Blaze v. Moon, 440 F.2d 1348 (5th Cir. 1971);
Gnotta v. United States, 415 F.2d 1271 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 934
(1970); Palmer v. Rogers, 33 AD. L.2d 893 (D.D.C. 1973) (taking a position contrary
to the Hackley case, supra note 1, that the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972
does not apply retroactively and, therefore, that sovereign immunity bars a discrimination action filed prior to passage of the Act); CORE v. Commissioner, Social Security
Administration, 270 F. Supp. 537 (D. Md. 1967). See generally Comment, supra note
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Further, the courts uniformly required employee-plaintiffs to completely exhaust the administrative remedies available to them prior to
invoking judicial relief. 4 This exhaustion of administrative remedies
requirement was logical in view of the universally accepted rule that
the district courts would not grant an aggrieved government employee
a trial de novo on his claim of discrimination,s but rather would ren24, at 280. But see Allison v. United States, 451 F.2d 1035 (Ct. Cl. 1971); Chambers
v. United States, 451 F.2d 1045 (Ct. Cl. 1971) ("absent . . . a clear manifestation
that access to the courts is prohibited .. . it is the intent of Congress that the
general jurisdictional statutes are controlling").
54. The general rule requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies in federal employment discrimination cases was stated by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
in the recent case of Beale v. Blount, 461 F.2d 1133 (5th Cir. 1972):
We adhere to the time-tested requirement that available administrative remedies be exhausted prior to the institution of a mandamus action. The federal
bureaucracy's efforts to police its own practices with respect to discrimination
in employment on the basis of race should not be undermined. This would
be the predictable effect of sanctioning resort to the federal courts before
completion of the administrative review process. Id. at 1139.
The importance of the doctrine can be illustrated by a comparison of the two
cases, Chambers v. United States, 451 F.2d 1045 (Ct. Cl. 1971), and Allison v. United
States, 451 F.2d 1035 (Ct. Cl. 1971). In Chambers, the court relied upon an administrative finding that the plaintiff had in fact been victimized by discrimination in its
decision to grant an award of back pay. The court reasoned that its decision did not
encroach upon administrative discretion inasmuch as the agency had already made the
finding of discrimination, thereby removing all discretionary elements from the case.
Id. at 1054. In Allison, however, the court remanded the case to the agency because the agency had not itself made the crucial determination of whether discrimination had been practiced against the plaintiff or not. The court refused to imply a
finding of discrimination from the facts disclosed in the agency record. Thus, the
plaintiff was, in effect, forced to begin anew the process of seeking relief. See 47
N.Y.U.L Rnv. 358, 365-66 (1972).
For other cases requiring the exhaustion of administrative remedies in federal employment cases, see Connelly v. Nitze, 401 F.2d 416 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Davis v. Secretary, HEW, 262 F. Supp. 124 (D.Md.), aff'd per curiam, 386 F.2d 429 (4th Cir.
1967); Pine v. United States, 371 F.2d 466 (Ct. Cl. 1967); Dargo v. United States,
176 Ct. Cl. 1193, 1201 (1966).
But cf. Penn v. Schlesinger, 490 F.2d 700 (5th Cir. 1973). In Penn, a
panel of the Fifth Circuit split three ways on the question of the exhaustion of administrative remedies requirement in a case brought by federal employees under the Civil
Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 et seq. (1970). Judge Tuttle held that complete exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required where the agency itself discourages the employee from pursuing his administrative remedies. Judge Morgan concuffed specially on the narrow ground that exhaustion is not required in cases brought
under § 1981. Judge Godbold dissented and argued that the exhaustion requirement
should not be waived solely because of the agency's attempt to discourage plaintiff from
seeking relief at the agency level. For a fuller discussion of Penn v. Schlesinger,
see Note, Exhaustion of Federal Administrative Remedies in Cases Under Section
1981 of the Civil Rights Act, 1974 DuKE L.J 408, in 1973 Developments.
55. See Polcover v. Secretary of Treasury, 477 F.2d 1223, 1225-26 (D.C. Cir.
1973) ("'Elmployee discharge cases, although cast in the mold of original actions in the district court ... are disposed of on the basis of the administra-
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der their decisions solely upon the administrative record. 50 The standards of review used by the courts in discrimination cases have varied
from a cursory examination to insure the absence of procedural error,57 through a test of whether the agency's action was "arbitrary or
capricious," 58s to the current evaluation of whether the administrative
ive record and should be governed by the principles generally applicable to judicial review of administrative action"); Adams v. Laird, 420 F.2d 230, 234 (D.C.
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1039 (1970) ("The record in the District Court
was the administrative record compiled in the agency proceedings."); Goldwasser v.
Brown, 417 F.2d 1169, 1171 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 922 (1970);
Connelly v. Nitze, 401 F.2d 416, 417 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Goodman v. United States,
358 F.2d 532 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Dabney v. Freeman, 358 F.2d 533, 535 (D.C. Cir.
1965); Allison v. United States, 451 F.2d 1035 (Ct. Cl. 1971); Chambers v. United
States, 451 F.2d 1045 (Ct. Cl. 1971). See also Pelicone v. Hodges, 320 F.2d 754
(D.C. Cir. 1963); Saggary v. Young, 240 F.2d 865 (D.C. Cir. 1956); Pine v. United
States, 371 F.2d 466 (Ct. Cl. 1967); Dargo v. United States, 176 Ct. Cl. 1193, 1201
(1966). See generally Sape & Hart, supra note 22, at 857; Note, Judicial Review of
Federal Employee Dismissals and Other Adverse Actions, 55 CoRNurL L. REv. 178,
185 (1972).
56. See cases cited in note 55 supra. A few cases have been remanded to the
district courts for hearings on a specific issue. See Williams v. Zuckert, 372 U.S. 765
(1963) (per curiam), rev'g 296 F.2d 416 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (remand for hearing on
the issue of whether plaintiff made timely and sufficient effort to obtain presence of
witnesses at his hearing); Studemeyer v. Macy, 320 F.2d 797 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (remand for hearing on timeliness and sufficiency of request for witnesses at administrative hearing). However, these cases seem to represent the exception rather than the
rule. It is more common for the courts to remand the case for a new hearing at the
agency level. See, e.g., Holden v. Finch, 446 F.2d 1311 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (remand
for hearing improperly denied by Civil Service Commission); Connelly v. Nitze, 401
F.2d 416 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (remand to Dept. of Navy for hearing improperly denied);
Scott v. Macy, 349 F.2d 182 (D.C. Cir. 1965), second appeal, 402 F.2d 644 (D.C.
Cir. 1968) (remand because of failure of record to support agency determination);
Goodman v. United States, 358 F.2d 532 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (remand for new hearing
at agency level on "voluntariness" of resignation); Dabney v. Freeman, 358 F.2d 533
(D.C. Cir. 1965) (approving district court's remand to agency by consent of the parties).
57. See, e.g., Hargett v. Summerfield, 243 F.2d 29, 32 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
353 U.S. 970 (1957); Boylan v. Quarles, 235 F.2d 834 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
This rather superficial standard of review was used in earlier cases when the courts
were more constrained by the doctrine of executive discretion in the employment field.
See notes 42-45 supra and accompanying text.
It should be noted that although the court of appeals decisions have enunciated
the governing standards of review, the standards are equally applicable in the district
courts, inasmuch as the district courts have conducted only a review of the administrative record and not a trial de novo. See note 60 infra and accompanying text.
58. See, e.g., Scott v. Macy, 402 F.2d 644, 652 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (dissenting opinion of Judge [now Chief Justice] Burger); Dabney v. Freeman, 358 F.2d 533, 537
(D.C. Cir. 1965); Eustace v. Day, 314 F.2d 247 (D.C. Cir. 1962). The use of the
"not arbitrary or capricious" standard of review seems to indicate an initial reluctance
on the part of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit to intervene
in the resolution of employment discrimination cases to any great extent.
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determination is supported by substantial evidence in the record. 9
The net result was that the district courts undertook an examination
of the administrative record not unlike the review of other agency determinations directly appealable to the courts of appeals. 60 Because
the generally available right of appeal from federal district courts to
the courts of appeals provides the same type of review, 61 the District
of Columbia Circuit has concluded in several cases that the intervention of the district court in the process of resolving a claim under section 717 is an unnecessary duplication of judicial effort and a waste
of plaintiff's time. 62 The opinions in these cases have therefore recommended that Congress act to eliminate district court review as a
6
step in the process. 3
59. The "substantial evidence" test does not seem to be firmly entrenched as the
standard of review to be used in employment discrimination cases. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit does, however, seem to be gravitating toward the use of this test. Thus, in Dabney v. Freeman, 358 F.2d 533, 535, 537 (D.C.
Cir. 1965), the court applied both the arbitrary or capricious and the substantial
evidence tests to the administrative record before it. In the more recent case of
Polcover v. Secretary of Treasury, 477 F.2d 1223, 1226 (D.C. Cir. 1973), the court
mentioned both tests but actually applied only the substantial evidence test.
In Hackley, the district court moved toward what appears to be an even more
stringent standard: "Accordingly, the administrative decision is . . . supported by a
preponderanceof the evidence. . . " 360 F. Supp. at 1253 (emphasis added).
60. See, e.g., Clayton Act § 11(d), 15 U.S.C. § 21(d) (1970) (exclusive jurisdiction of courts of appeals over anti-monopoly orders entered by the ICC, FCC, CAB,
Federal Reserve Board, or FTC); Federal Trade Commission Act § 5(d), 15 U.S.C.
§ 45(d) (1970) (exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of appeals to review cease and
desist orders of the FTC); 28 U.S.C. § 2342 (1970) (exclusive jurisdiction in courts
of appeals to review final orders of the FCC, Secretary of Agriculture, Federal Maritime Commission, AEC, and Federal Maritime Administration); National Labor Relations Act § 10(f), 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (1970) (exclusive jurisdiction in the courts of
appeals to review orders of the NLRB).
In Polcover v. Secretary of Treasury, 477 F.2d 1223, 1227 (D.C. Cir. 1973), the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit recognized the similarity between
the district and circuit court's review of a section 717 claim by stating:
In other words, we conduct the identical review we are so often called upon
to use in statutorily provided judicial review of other agency orders, e.g.,
F.C.C., N.L.R.B., F.T.C. The only difference is that in this instance our review follows identical review in the district court.
61. 28 U.S.C. H9 1291, 1292 (1970). These provisions govern the customary appeal from an adverse determination in the district court to the court of appeals.
62. See Polcover v. Secretary of Treasury, 477 F.2d 1223, 1225 (D.C. Cir. 1973);
Adams v. Laird, 420 F.2d 230, 234 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1039
(1970); Goldwasser v. Brown, 417 F.2d 1169, 1171 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 922 (1970); Scott v. Macy, 402 F.2d 644, 647 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Connelly v. Nitze, 401 F.2d 416, 417 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Dabney v. Freeman, 358 F.2d
533 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
63. See cases cited in note 62 supra. In Connelly v. Nitze, 401 F.2d 416, 417
n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1968), for example, the court of appeals stated:
We have pointed out before that these employee discharge cases, although
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The plaintiffs in Hackley v. Johnson 4 and Franklin v. Laird65
contended that Congress, in adding section 717 to the Civil Rights

Act of 1964,66 had acted in exactly the opposite direction-namely,
to give the district courts a more meaningful role in the vindication
of federal employment rights by insuring a trial de novo on an appeal
to them from an adverse agency determination. The District Court
for the District of Columbia disagreed, however, and held that section

717 was not intended to change the existing procedure of dual review
of the administrative record by both the district court and the court

of appeals. 67

Noting that to grant a new hearing on factual matters

already considered at the agency level would further delay the available relief and impose a heavy burden upon the district courts,6 a the

court stated further that a "search of the legislative history and consideration of the Act's language reveals no clear-cut congressional determination to require trial de novo as a matter of right ... ."69 The
decision not to grant a new trial in every case was buttressed by what
the court saw as renewed congressional faith in the expertise and
integrity of the Civil Service Commission." ° The court also declared
in form original actions in the District Court, are in reality agency review
proceedings and are normally treated as such by all parties. .. . This creates
difficulties, as here, in our ability to give, effectively and expeditiously, the
most appropriate kind of relief. It also raises questions as to why Congress
should not provide for statutory direct review of Civil Service Commission
determinations in employee cases, comparable to that now employed in respect
of other major federal administrative agencies.
64. 360 F. Supp. 1247 (D.D.C. 1973). See notes 1, 3-10 supra and accompanying text.
65. Id. See notes 2, 3, 11-17 supra and accompanying text.
66. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 § 11, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-16
(Supp. 1974), amending Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970). This
amendment, adding section 717 to the Civil Rights Act of 1964, is reproduced in note
3 supra.
67. 360 F. Supp. at 1250. The court stated:
The grant of jurisdiction to the Federal Courts leaves open how that jurisdiction should be exercised. Traditionally the courts have been somewhat
loath to interfere with federal employment standards. Gradually the courts
have moved from a flat denial of jurisdiction to a review limited to statutory
compliance and procedural due process, to requiring proof of an affirmative
exercise of discretion, to a search for substantial evidence supporting the action, and recently, to the rational-basis test. . . . These have been the progressive standards in discharge and other federal employment cases but resolution of the controversy has always been on the administrative record. (Emphasis added).
68. Id. at 1249, 1252. The court noted that nineteen claims of discrimination
against a wide variety of federal agencies were still pending before it at the time of
its decision in Hackley. Id. at 1249 n.2.
69. Id. at 1250. The court did, however, reserve the right to take supplemental
testimony in cases where the agency record did not affirmatively establish an absence
of discrimination by "the clear weight of the evidence." Id. at 1252.
70. Id. at 1251. The court noted the promulgation of new regulations by the Civil
Service Commission in response to its newly-created powers under the 1972 amend-
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that the congressional decision to make those Title VII rights available
to employees in the private sector likewise applicable to federal employees 71 was intended to guarantee access to the courts, but not necessarily a new hearing. 2 In fact, the court found that the statutory
authorization to appoint a master in cases which have been delayed
over 120 days73 indicated that ordinarily the district court would confine its review to the administrative record, inasmuch as that record
4
is tantamount to a master's report.7

The legislative history of section 71775 is, as the district court
stated, not "clear-cut '70 on the issue of whether a plaintiff in a federal
employment discrimination action is entitled to a trial de novo as a
matter of right. An examination of the evils which the statute was intended to curb, however, seems to support a result contrary to that
reached by the court. By the passage of section 717, Congress intended
to take the long-needed step of bringing federal employees within the
ambit of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. r With the major
exception that the Civil Service Commission, rather than the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, was the agency designated to police
the bureaucracy, 78 federal employees were given those procedural rights
already enjoyed by employees in the private sector. The district court's
reading of section 717 in Hackley, however, effectively deprives victims of federal employment discrimination of the rights given to them
by the 1972 legislation. Under the Hackley rule, the federal employee-plaintiff does not have an unqualified right to a hearing in the
ments. See notes 29, 30 supra and accompanying text. Further, the court asserted that
the Commission's greater expertise would enable it "to differentiate between pure discrimination claims and the underlying intricacies of civil service regulations governing
job qualification selection for promotion, training and the like" more effectively than
the district courts. Id. at 1252.
71. See notes 32-41 supraand accompanying text.
72. 360 F. Supp. at 1252.
73. See note 38 supra. The function of a master is to find the facts from which
the court draws conclusions of law. See C. WRIGHT, THE LAw oF FEDERAL COuRTs
436 (2d ed. 1970).
74. 360 F. Supp. at 1252 n.10.
75. See notes 25-41 supra and accompanying text.
76. 360 F. Supp. at 1250. Prior to the decisions in Hackley, one set of commentators had concluded that section 717 does contemplate a trial de novo in the district
court. See Sape & Hart, supra note 22, at 857, wherein the authors state:
Even more significant is the scope of the court's jurisdiction. Unlike review of agency action pursuant to section 10 of the Procedure Act whereby
the court merely determines whether an agency's action is supported by substantial evidence, an action by an aggrieved federal employee under the
1972 Act requires a trial de novo. (Emphasis added.)
77. See notes 25, 26 supra and accompanying text.
78. See notes 27-29 supra and accompanying text.

Vol. 1974:474]

ADMINISTRATIVE LA W-1973

489

impartial forum of a federal district court-a right that is enjoyed by

private plaintiffs under section 706. 7 9 Instead, the federal employee
must first attempt to prove his case before the very agency which allegedly discriminated against him. Following an adverse determination by the agency, the plaintiff can again attempt to prove his allegations before the Civil Service Commission. Yet, it was the failure

of that very Commission to combat federal discrimination effectively
that led to the adoption of section 717 in the first instance.8 0

Even

conceding the fact that Congress expressed renewed faith in the Commission's ability to eradicate discriminatory employment practices, 8 ' it
would seem that to grant a new hearing in the district court would
further the larger purposes of the statute. 2 A review of the printed

record of agency proceedings, no matter how stringent the standard, 3
simply cannot replace the court's first-hand observation and appraisal
of the evidence.8 4 Further, such an appraisal would serve to insure
79. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1970).
80. See note 25 supra.
81. See notes 27-29 supra and accompanying text.
82. But see Hackley v. Johnson, 360 F. Supp. 1247, 1252 (D.D.C. 1973), where
the court noted that the legislative history indicated that
Congress wanted prompt and consistent decisions in these discrimination matters. A trial de novo does not accomplish this but rather works in the opposite direction for a wholly new record must be made and opportunity for reasonable discovery provided.
d . .[Ain interpretation that embraces an automatic requirement of trial
de novo in all instances with all its inherent uncertain and substantial delays
will defeat rather than advance the Act's objectives.
83. For a discussion of the standards of review used by the courts reviewing agency
determination in discrimination cases, see notes 57-59 supra and accompanying text.
But see Hackley v. Johnson, 360 F. Supp. 1247 (D.D.C. 1973). The Hackley court
concluded that the proper method of ensuring non-discrimination in federal employment
was to "establish an especially high standard of review. . . " Id. at 1252. The court
stressed that "lpirecious rights of individuals are involved and these must not be obfuscated by procrustean adherence to standards of review that are more semantic than
substantial." Id.
84. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a); United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S.
174, 194 n.9 (1963); Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278,
291 (1960); Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 60910 (1950); United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 394 (1948);
C. WRIGHT, supra note 73, at 429-32.
The district court in Hackley argued that the statutory authorization to appoint
a master in delayed cases countenances a district court review limited to the administrative record. See notes 38, 73, 74 supra and accompanying text. The court reasoned that both procedures result in a review of a written record rather than original
observation of the evidence. 360 F. Supp. at 1250-51. The court's argument is of
questionable validity. In the first place, the court has the power to appoint a master
in whom it has confidence. See FED. R. Civ. P. 53(a); C. WiGHT, supra note 73,
at 436. The court, of course, has no corresponding control over who is appointed to
hear evidence in discrimination proceedings in the various agencies or the Civil Service
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that the Civil Service Commission is indeed proceeding in a fair and
purposeful manner to eliminate employment decisions based upon ilegally biased considerations. This degree of scrutiny is granted to the
victims of discrimination in the private sector,85 and it would seem,
therefore, to be more in keeping with the expressed intent of Congress
to make the federal government a model of fair employment practices 6
to accord the same right to federal employees.
The decision in Hackley has the unfortunate connotation of accommodating the convenience of the court at the expense of aggrieved
federal employees. While the conservation of judicial time and energy is certainly necessary and desirable, the rights of victims of alleged discrimination by the federal government should not be sacrificed to the attainment of that end; more especially when the purposed
"saving" of judicial resources actually results in a net loss. As the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has pointed out on
at least six occasions, the review of the agency record by the district
court is essentially a wasted duplication of effort because the very same
review is undertaken again at the appellate level.8 7 Given the experience of the courts of appeals in reviewing agency proceedings, there
is no necessity for the interjection of the district court, unless that court
conducts its own de novo examination of the evidence. By holding
that a trial de novo is available to aggrieved ,federal employees following an adverse agency determination, the district courts would insure for
themselves a more meaningful role in the struggle against employment
discrimination in the federal government.
Commission. Secondly, the statute authorizes appointment of a master only whenever
a hearing is delayed over 120 days. See note 38 supra. The statute thus seems to
contemplate that the district court will itself hold a hearing, at least in those cases
that are not delayed over 120 days.
85. See Evans v. Local 2127, Elec. Workers, 313 F. Supp. 1354, 1362 (N.D.
Ga. 1969); King v. Georgia Power Co., 295 F. Supp. 943 (N.D. Ga. 1968). See note
33 supra and accompanying text.
86. See note 25 supra.
87. See notes 60-63 supra and accompanying text. It is true that, were the district
courts to undertake de novo hearings in these cases, there would be a substantial duplication of the efforts already expended at the agency level. See text accompanying
notes 4, 5 and 13, 14 supra. In view of the greater impartiality of the courts, however,
it seems more justifiable to have the district courts retread the path previously taken
by the agency and Commission, rather than duplicate the role of the court of appeals.

